A Cruel Legacy


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Thursday, May 30, 2019

THE METALS AND CONTROLS CONTROVERSY

THE METALS AND CONTROLS CONTROVERSY

We now present a very intimate look inside the early nuclear fuel business through a very provocative letter written to Dr. Lee Davenport, President of Sylvania-Corning Nuclear by Jim V.  There is much sordid account in this letter, and at this present date (2012) I have absolutely no idea how much of this letter is true, false, founded or unfounded.  What is important here to us in our look at Sylcor is NOT the business-politics controversy at M&C (a direct Sylcor competitor) we're about to uncover, but rather what Jim tells Davenport about the implications it carries for Sylcor.  Also important are Jim's assessments of Sylcor's safety controls.  I hope no one alive today, or related to the principals mentioned in this letter, is offended - no harm is meant or wished by publication of this letter.

This letter is dated August 21, 1958 and is reproduced in entirety.

Dear Lee:

In the course of the past few weeks, the sordid story of what transpired at Metals and Controls has gradually been unfolded to me.  The manner in which the situation apparently developed is such that I felt you should be informed.

The following information is hearsay!

The major items of information were given me by an official of the Atomic Energy Commission.  The inside facts are purported to have come from an executive in a competing company.  We both know this man, and his integrity is unimpeachable.  Further, he is a close personal associate of the principals.

Rathbun Willard, Chairman of the Board of Metals and Controls, is in his late 70's; as a philanthropic gesture, he disposed of certain blocks of stock as outright gifts to various educational institutions.  His legal advisers apparently did not take adequate steps to insure retention of the proxy vote on these shares.  One of the colleges to whom such shares were given is purported to be Northeastern University.

The story has it that Jerry Ottmar, President of Metals and Controls Nuclear Company, was not on the best of terms with Carroll Wilson, President of the parent corporation, ex-Admiral, and close associate of Rickover.  Working through friendly interests at Northeastern, Wilson obtained the proxy votes held by that college, which together with other proxy and personally held stock, gave him a sizable vote for control of the Corporation.  Wilson also called a special meeting of the Board of Directors at a time when Mr. Willard was in Europe.  Mr. Willard's attorneys attempted to forestall the meeting to defer action on the proposed agenda until Willard could return.

The meeting was deliberately called at such a time because Mr. Willard has a known phobia against air travel.  Mr. Willard's attorneys were unsuccessful in their attempt to delay the meeting.  Despite his phobia, Mr. Willard made immediate arrangements to return by air.  The meeting was held on a Saturday; Mr. Willard was unable to return until Sunday.

The following action is reported to have taken place at the meeting:  Mr. Wilson presented to the assembled Board of Directors, minus Mr. Willard, documentary evidence charging Ottmar with mal-administration.  By a unanimous vote of the assembled Directors, Ottmar was removed from office, and Carroll Wilson assumed the Presidency of both companies.

Ottmar has not given up, and upon Willard's return, the entire mess resolved into a free-for-all in which both Wilson and Willard resigned.  Wilson has been named Chairman of an advisory committee, and George L. Williams, Treasurer, has become acting President of both firms until such time as the issues can be resolved. 

Up to this point, the situation would appear to be typical of the machinations frequently found in the internal politics of American Corporations.  The following facts, and I use the word advisedly, since they came to me from the person who is purported to have taken the action, seemed to be worthy of your careful consideration.  The documentary evidence presented to the Board by Wilson is claimed to have emanated from the Idaho Operations Office of the Atomic Energy Commission.  They were reported to be letters expressing dissatisfaction with criticality control, production control, and health physics administration at M&C.  The Commission deplored the lack of concern and attention by Jerry Ottmar on such matters which they maintained to be a major responsibility of his position.  It is claimed that these letters were intended to correct a situation rather than to cause personal discomfiture to Mr. Ottmar.  Wilson probably played the part of an opportunist in using them as he did.  The Commission's attitude is that they do not feel sorry for Mr. Ottmar since they held him responsible for what they considered to be extremely lax and ultimately dangerous handling of the uranium administrative problems, including as the officer expressed to me, one instance of subcriticality, in which criticality was averted only by alert action on the part of the AEC.

Another source has been quoted to me as saying that, "The Admiral (Rickover) is not displeased."

I am fairly familiar with the production setup at M&C, having administered the production phase in the Core Contract Group at Bettis.  The M&C system was not exemplary; but, I believe, and please forgive me for the remark, was superior to Sylcor's.  The AEC has the prerogative to issue a cease operation order on any organization which it feels is not operating in the best interests of safety.  Several such orders have already been issued.  I am concerned that, with the influx of more and more orders, we may find Sylcor operations have extended beyond the system of controls that have worked so well in the past.  The AEC's attitude, should Sylcor become involved in any unfortunate incident, would undoubtedly be conditioned by a reflection of the fact that the worst commercial accident to date happened at Bayside {a Sylcor facility}.  Certain of our contacts in the west have not let me forget this fact.  Perhaps my concern is groundless.  Certainly you have every right to tell me to stick to marketing and refrain from comments on operations many miles removed from my sphere of action.

However, the potential load of ETR {Engineering Test Reactor, which Sylcor was making elements for} combined with the Fermi elements presents a new production situation at Sylcor.  ETR is under Commission Administration by the same organization which spearheaded the internal situation at M&C, and I felt that it would be unwise if I did not immediately bring this story to your attention.

Because of the personalities involved, many of whom have been associates in the past, I would appreciate your confidence with respect to the disclosure of the contents of this letter.  I informed Stan Roboff  that I was writing you concerning the M&C situation, and he requested a copy promising not to reveal its contents and further agreeing to destroy the copy after reading.  I have a profound distaste for gossip and/or gossipers.  Since what I have said represents hearsay, I may have placed myself in a position of repeating gossip.  The potential significance of the hearsay appeared to me to be so important to you and to Sylcor that I can but trust you will receive its repetition as evidence of good judgment.  If not, I can but ask your indulgence in view of my good intentions."


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